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 Editorial 
 Introducing global integral constitutionalism 
 j a m e s   t u l l y  ,   j e f f r e y  l .   d u n o f f  ,   a n t h o n y  f .   l a n g   j r .  , 
 m a t t i a s   k u m m  a n d   a n t j e   w i e n e r  
 Introduction 
 As we stated in our 2012 and 2014 editorials,  Global Constitutionalism 
is a scholarly arena of critical reﬂ ection on the contested ﬁ eld of global 
law and governance. Although there is a long history of global interaction 
among peoples, empires and colonies, the ﬁ eld was re-articulated as 
global and globalising after World War II and, with even more and 
widespread insistence, after the end of the Cold War. The ﬁ eld includes 
the law and politics of states and state-centred international law, but it 
situates these in the dense, global legal and governmental relationships, 
institutions and processes within, around and beyond the state and 
state-centred systems (that is, globalisation from above, in between and 
below). 
 We emphasised in our 2013 editorial that this is an inherently contested 
ﬁ eld in both practice and theory. We invited scholars from multiple 
disciplines to submit articles on the contested practical problems of law, 
governance and ethics of the ﬁ eld from their different methodological and 
normative perspectives, whether these are empirical case studies, historical 
interpretations, or middle- and high-level theoretical contributions. Our 
objective was and remains to bring to life an ongoing critical dialogue 
among contributors and readers around the world from their diverse 
perspectives. This  Global Constitutionalism dialogue is not based on a 
pre-emptive editorial consensus or an implicit orientation towards 
consensus as the end point. Rather, it is an attempt to instantiate the kind 
of critical and problem-oriented dialogue that David Bohm, the great 
scientist and philosopher, argued is necessary if we are to clarify and 
address effectively the crises we face today. This is a form of dialogue that 
takes into account the fact that all perspectives are limited (perspectival) 
and, therefore, all disclosures of the problem and proposed solution are 
also limited. Thus, they always require the reciprocal enlightenment of 
engagement with alternative perspectives to bring each other’s explicit 
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claims and implicit presuppositions (limits) into the space of questions and 
create a genuinely multi-perspectival critical dialogue.  1  
 The contributors to  Global Constitutionalism have been remarkably 
successful in initiating this kind of dialogue in the journal and the events, 
courses and discussions that have grown around it. We look forward to its 
continuation and especially to contributions from perspectives that have 
not yet entered the arena. To facilitate this enlargement of the dialogue, 
in the 2015 editorial we argued that the global crises of the ‘hard times’ of 
the present call into question the globalisation of the trinity of human 
rights, democracy and rule of law, as well as the progressive narrative 
that underlies it. We suggested in response that human rights, democracy 
and rule of law should be seen as historically contingent and contested 
phenomena that should be studied contextually from a plurality of perspectives 
outside of the progressive framework in which they are normally situated. 
Furthermore, we welcomed submissions that not only critique the progressive 
narrative, but also the colonial and post-colonial imperial project of 
international law that it is said to legitimate by its critics. We would now 
like to take this suggestion a step further by sketching one such critical 
and contestable perspective and the alternative understanding of global 
constitutionalism that it discloses. We are not endorsing this perspective, 
but, rather, bringing it into the arena for critical consideration. 
 I.  The development paradigm and human rights, democracy and rule 
of law 
 Global constitutionalism refers to the global ﬁ eld of diverse, formal 
and informal assemblages of laws and governance, norms and actors that 
exhibit  constitutional qualities . Although they are contested, constitutional 
qualities include features such as: the distribution and separation of powers, 
responsibilities, rights and ofﬁ ces; secondary rules that constitute and limit 
primary rules, courts and governments; bindingness and compliance 
mechanisms; degrees and types of institutionalisation; intergenerational 
persistence; publicity, non-arbitrariness and contestedness; and widely 
accepted norms of legitimation. A sufﬁ cient number of such features constitute 
assemblages of governance and laws as ‘systems’. Different systems of laws 
and governance around the globe exhibit various subsets of these constitutional 
qualities and, accordingly, are called constitutions, constitutional systems, 
and ‘processes of constitutionalisation’ to that extent. 
 In the modern West, constitutions and constitutional processes are 
standardly seen as the basic constitutional qualities or structure of a state 
 1  D  Bohm ,  On Dialogue ( Routledge ,  London and New York, NY ,  2014 ). 
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and state system under international law that  coordinates the domains of law, 
representative governance, foreign policy, economy, technology, military-
industrial complexes, public and private, human rights, citizen participation 
and popular sovereignty (or constituent power). The well-known, unattained 
yet enduring immanent ideal of this modern form of constitutionalism is 
that the constitutional qualities coordinate the constituent power of the 
people (or peoples) and the rule of law across these domains so that they 
are always equally basic or equiprimordial: the people and peoples who are 
subject to the laws are also the ongoing authors of them, directly and/or 
through delegated and revocable representatives (what we call democratic 
constitutionalism). 
 Broadly speaking, the space of questions our journal seeks to open 
includes questions such as: what are the global assemblages of law and 
governance? What kinds of constitutional qualities do they exhibit? What 
systems of coordination or non-coordination do they bring about, and with 
what consequences? Do new spaces emerge where constitutional norms 
are negotiated by a plurality of stakeholders? And if so, what are the 
potentially novel organising principles that are forged through these bottom-
up practices of constitutionalisation? The objective is to enquire into these 
sorts of question without disclosing the ﬁ eld in terms of constitutionalisation 
within states, yet also to learn from the similarities and dissimilarities 
between state and global constitutionalisation. 
 In our 2012 editorial we noted that three norms of legitimation of 
constitutional states (human rights, democracy and rule of law) were 
predicated of processes of globalisation from the founding of the United 
Nations onward. Much of the contestation of globalisation has been devoted 
to struggling for their realisation in diverse practices and to critical reﬂ ection 
on the norms and practices of implementation from different perspectives 
and traditions of interpretation in academic research. Yet, much of this 
research, in  Global Constitutionalism articles and elsewhere, shows how 
poorly these norms represent the real, grim and violent world of contemporary 
globalisation. This disconnection between the trinity and the real world 
of globalisation is the reason we turned in our 2015 editorial to question 
a fourth norm predicated of globalisation: progressive development. This 
norm posits a set of global processes that is presumed to bring about the 
necessary historical conditions for realising democracy, human rights and 
rule of law. This supposed relationship between a certain kind of economic 
and technical development and the realisation of human rights, democracy 
and rule of law is the ‘development paradigm’ we wish to examine. 
 From this modernising and globalising perspective, human rights, 
democracy and rule of law are not seen as primary or constitutive 
constitutional qualities, but, rather, as secondary constitutional qualities 
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that are realised by the gradual spread around the globe of the more 
basic constitutional qualities of the development paradigm. Economic 
and technical development move assemblages of law, governance and forms 
of subjectivity through stages of development from authoritarianism to 
modern constitutionalisation, rule of law, social mobilisation, human 
rights and democratisation. In 1944 Karl Polanyi pointed out the three 
constitutive processes and institutions of economic constitutionalisation that 
drive development: the privatisation, commodiﬁ cation and constitutionalisation 
of the earth (natural resources); human productive capacities (human 
resources); and money (ﬁ scal resources). That is, private law precedes and 
sets out the range and limits of regulatory possibilities for public law and 
its coordination role.  2  
 According to the development paradigm, these three processes and 
institutions of commodiﬁ cation are placed under the control of private 
corporations and spread around the world and protected by military and 
ﬁ nancial competition among states during and after colonisation; by 
proﬁ t-driven competition among corporations; and by competition among 
governments, parties, unions, communities and individuals for jobs. In 
time and through the exercise of military and ﬁ nancial power, the more 
advanced states and corporations establish institutions of global governance 
and bring the weaker states in line. Once the primary constitutional qualities 
of economic constitutionalisation are secured by top-down institutions of 
global law and governance, the realisation of the secondary constitutional 
qualities of human rights, democracy and regulatory rule of law will follow 
by progressive social mobilisation, governments and civil society actors 
engaging in reforms or revolutions. Global constitutionalisation thus 
follows the same general development pattern as state constitutionalisation, 
yet with speciﬁ c differences in stages and the much-discussed question of 
the institutional form of the end state (world state, plurality, hegemony, 
communism, unlimited growth, endless conﬂ ict, and so on). 
 The central dynamism of development is explained by its mobilisation 
of competitive freedom and the lack of any overall plan or governance, 
which would intervene in the private sphere, infringe on freedom, and 
stiﬂ e growth. Hence, establishing the historical conditions for the global 
realisation of human rights, democracy and rule of law, and thus global 
justice and perpetual peace, is the unintended consequence of self-interested 
competition for wealth and power of the free actors caught up in the 
modernising processes. Vicious means bring about virtuous ends. 
 2  K  Polanyi ,  The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time , 
Introduction by  J  Stiglitz ( Beacon Press ,  Boston, MA ,  2004 ) . See further at  section IV below. 
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 This ‘hidden-hand’ development paradigm became orthodoxy in the 
nineteenth century. Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Georg W Hegel, 
John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx and Max Weber initiated its major schools 
of interpretation and legitimation. These schools have continued to 
dominate the interpretation, legitimation and debate of globalisation since 
World War II. 
 When critics raise doubts about this meta-narrative over the last century 
and in our times, its apparent setbacks and depressions are explained by 
uneven development or the backwardness of those who resist. Its remarkable 
capacity to overthrow non-compliant regimes, defeat revolutions, survive 
wars and crises, and continue to grow is said to be proof of its inevitability 
and the non-existence of any alternative modernity or globalisation. 
Moreover, the very idea of progressive development by means qualitatively 
different from its legitimating ends enables its proponents to locate its 
norms of legitimation in the realm of the ‘to come’ no matter what happens. 
Thus, the discontented and impatient are told to become mature, stay the 
course in the face of hard and seemingly contradictory times, and hold 
tight to the blind faith that more inequality will lead eventually to equality; 
war and war preparation to peace and disarmament, authoritarian rule 
to democracy; competition to cooperation; capitalism to communism, 
securitisation to liberty, emergency law to rule of law; withholding human 
rights to human rights; more development to creative technological climate 
change solutions, and so on.  3  
 II.  Sustainability crises 
 Despite these sophisticated yet circular defences of the development 
paradigm in response to recurrent anomalies, critical scholars and activists 
remain unpersuaded. They continue to raise objections and offer alternatives.  4  
They point to four global sustainability crises that appear to be brought 
 3  Immanuel Kant,  Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent and Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels,  The Communist Manifesto , presented two of the most inﬂ uential versions of 
this structure of argument that vicious means, while unjust, are necessary means to virtuous 
ends, despite appearances to the contrary. Mahatma Gandhi,  Hind Swaraj , and Hannah 
Arendt,  On Violence , presented two of most inﬂ uential criticisms of it and alternatives to it. 
They both reasserted the traditional view that vicious means beget vicious ends and virtuous 
means beget virtuous ends. 
 4  The classic refutation of the development paradigm is  G  Rist ,  The History of Development: 
From Western Origins to Global Faith ( Zed Books ,  London ,  1997 ) . For a careful analysis of 
how the unexamined faith in development continues in the contemporary normative literature 
on globalisation, see  A  Allen ,  The End of Progress ( Columbia University Press ,  New York, NY , 
forthcoming  2016 ). 
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about by the development paradigm and which ﬂ y in the face of its faith in 
progress.  5  
 The ﬁ rst crisis is the systemic, intergenerational inequalities, poverty, 
starvation and suffering within the Global South, and, increasingly within the 
Global North. The second is the expanding military-industrial-intelligence 
complexes engaged in escalating cycles of violence and counter-violence: 
war preparation, wars of massive human, infrastructural and environmental 
destruction, reconstruction, and rearmament. The third is the ecological 
crisis, including climate change and the onset of a sixth mass extinction. 
The fourth is the refugee and migrant crisis. 
 These four global crises are interconnected by the global processes 
that bring them about and reproduce them. The historical processes of 
modernisation, industrialisation, Western expansion, economic globalisation 
and rapid exploitation and depletion of the world’s renewable and non-
renewable resources are the major cause of climate change and the 
ecological crisis. They are also the major cause of the inequalities between 
the global north and south, and within the global north and south. 
And, one of the primary roles of the escalating global military-industrial 
complexes of the great powers is to protect and expand the very processes 
of economic globalisation that are deeply implicated in the ecological and 
inequality crises. Major factors of the refugee and migrant crisis are the 
destabilising effects of Western imperialism, the war and arms sales complex, 
poverty, climate change and the ethnic and religious differences that these 
processes transform into armed antagonisms. These four interconnected 
processes generate resistances of various kinds, and the responses to the 
resistances in turn often generate complex positive feedback loops that 
amplify the inequalities, recourse to violence and counter-violence, and 
ecological damage, pollution and global warming. Moreover, the interactions 
of these far-from-equilibrium complex systems produce multiple, ramifying 
collateral and boomerang effects and tipping points on all life systems 
on earth that are difﬁ cult, if not impossible, to predict and control, as we 
mentioned in our 2015 editorial.  6  
 As a result, these systemic crises are called ‘sustainability and well-being’ 
crises because their cumulative effects damage and destroy the interdependent 
social, ecological and atmospheric networks and cycles that co-sustain the life 
and well-being of Homo sapiens and millions of non-human species and 
ecosystems. They are damaging and destroying the ecological conditions and 
 5  The most comprehensive account is  C  Dilworth ,  Too Smart for Our Own Good: The 
Ecological Predicament of Humankind ( Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge ,  2010 ) . For our 
disagreement with the doomsaying conclusion he draws, see text accompanying n 27 below. 
 6  See also  LR  Brown ,  World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic 
Collapse ( WW Norton and Co ,  London ,  2011 ). 
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living networks that have sustained life on earth for over 3.5 billion years as the 
successive reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show.  7  
The evidence for this multiple crisis of sustainability and well-being was 
sufﬁ cient by the 1980s for a new norm to emerge and be widely accepted 
in principle across all systems of law and governance: sustainability and 
well-being.  8  
 III.  Global economic constitutionalism 
 Moreover, these four crises take place in the context of a global democratic 
deﬁ cit that severely constrains effective responses. When governments 
and citizens organise to contest, regulate and reform the unsustainable 
development processes they ﬁ nd that they are severely limited by the global 
economic constitution of the development paradigm in the following anti-
democratic ways. The global processes of development that are the major 
causes of the crises are driven largely by transnational corporations (TNCs) 
that proﬁ t from the activities that cause them. They have grown so large 
on the basis of the three commodiﬁ cations that they are now more powerful 
than most governments and citizens’ movements. Governments and citizens 
have become dependent on them for taxes, ﬁ nancing, jobs and consumer 
lifestyles that feed the crises. TNCs have become ‘shadow sovereigns’.  9  
 From the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (WB) to the latest Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), such as Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Transpaciﬁ c Trade Partnership 
(TTP), they put in place global systems of trade laws, agreements and treaties. 
These legal regimes function as the constitutional quality of ‘secondary 
rules’ relative to national constitutions, democracy, human rights and rule 
of law. The resulting form of global constitutionalism is often called 
 7  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,  Climate Change 2014: Fifth Assessment 
Synthesis Report: Longer Report (November 2014) and  S  Harding ,  Animate Earth: Science, 
Intuition and Gaia ( Green Books ,  Totnes ,  2013 ) for an analysis of the earlier reports. 
 8  The Club of Rome Report entitled  The Limits to Growth was ﬁ rst published in 1972 and 
is recognised as one of the most inﬂ uential books of the twentieth century in bringing the crisis 
of sustainability to the attention of the scientiﬁ c community and the broader public. See also 
 U  Bardi ,  The Limits to Growth Revisited ( Springer ,  New York, NY ,  2011 ) for a survey of its 
inﬂ uence. For a careful explication of the norm of sustainability and well-being, see  A  Bandarage , 
 Sustainability and Well-Being: The Middle Path to Environment, Society and the Economy 
( Palgrave ,  London ,  2013 ). 
 9  S  George ,  Shadow Sovereigns: How Global Corporations Are Seizing Power ( Polity Press , 
 Cambridge ,  2015 ) . The following summary of economic constitutionalism draws on this study 
and, C Cutler, ‘Legal Pluralism as the ‘‘Common Sense’ of Transnational Capitalism’’  Oñati Socio-
Legal Series [online] 3(4) 719–40. Available from < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327501 >. 
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neo-liberal constitutionalism or ‘economic constitutionalism’. (The troika 
of the IMF, European Central Bank and European Commission is argued 
to function in a similar manner in the European Union.) 
 The institutions associated with global economic constitutionalism 
possess the authority to limit, restructure or override the authority of 
democratically legitimate national constitutions and rule of law. They often 
prescribe rules and policies that override and roll back well-established civil, 
social, economic and environmental rights, impose austerity programmes, 
and generate chronic unemployment. Similarly, their Investor to State Dispute 
Settlement institutions (ISDS) supplant the authority of national courts. 
Democratic governments, implementing the will of their citizens, can be 
and are sued by TNCs for millions of dollars for actions intended to 
advance environmental, health, safety, and other legitimate social interests. 
Furthermore, there is a deep asymmetry in access to the institutions of 
global economic constitutionalism. Only foreign investors can initiate 
a claim process. Thus, the narrow deﬁ nition of ‘stakeholder’ in these 
institutions effectively disempowers the vast majority of citizens (and 
non-human life forms) that are massively affected by global economic 
treaties and agreements. Moreover, TNCs’ well-paid lobbyists, and a 
handful of ofﬁ cially recognised non-governmental organisations, exercise 
non-democratic and disproportionate inﬂ uence on the world’s governments, 
institutions of global governance, and the United Nations. In these and 
numerous other ways, the institutions associated with global economic 
governance violate the basic principle of democratic legitimacy that all 
subject and all affected should have a say. And, ﬁ nally, the secret drafting of 
the agreements violates the basic principles of transparency and justiﬁ cation. 
The processes that support global economic constitutionalism thus enact 
an anti-contestatory mode of constitutionalism. 
 Furthermore, the various international attempts by governments and 
institutions of global governance to cooperate through negotiations, treaties, 
protocols and accords in order to reduce poverty and social suffering, reduce 
war and increase disarmament, and to reduce global warming and repair 
destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity since the 1960s have been limited 
at best. These failures and limited successes are not all due to the inﬂ uence 
of TNCs. They are also often due to denial, short-term interests trumping 
long-term consequences, and strategic geopolitical-economic competition 
among unequal states in the more familiar realist sense. However, even in 
these more traditional coordination problems TNCs play a signiﬁ cant and 
non-democratic role. 
 In these and other ways, global economic constitutionalism protects the 
development paradigm and TNCs from ‘interference’ (regulation) in the 
name of the primary rights of corporate persons, free trade and unlimited 
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growth. In so doing, the development paradigm does not unintentionally 
lay the groundwork for human rights, democracy and rule of law to come, 
as the ofﬁ cial narrative has it. Rather, it tends to produce and reproduce the 
crises of sustainability and well-being, and limit and override democratic and 
high-level attempts to address them. These are arguably the real unintended 
consequences of the development paradigm in our time. On this view, 
the power of the global economic constitutionalisation of the development 
paradigm and its crises does not begin with neo-liberalism, TNCs and the 
state-owned enterprises of China. They derive from the global enclosure 
and commodiﬁ cation of the last three centuries: that is, from the beginning 
of the Anthropocene age.  10  
 IV.  The great disembedding: Extraction and externalisation 
 We can respond effectively to the four sustainability crises only if we 
understand how the development paradigm generates its unsustainable 
effects. Much of the academic literature on this points to Karl Polanyi’s 
analysis in 1944 as among the best ﬁ rst-generation explanations under 
a sustainability and well-being framework and which more recent 
multidisciplinary and global research has substantiated and improved.  11  
Polanyi argued that during the great transformation of the last two 
centuries the dominant economic system has been disembedded from 
within the much larger ecological and social systems that sustain all life 
on earth and inserted in abstract and competitive economic, legal and 
governmental relationships that are dependent on, yet destructive of the 
carrying capacity of the encompassing ecological and social systems. The 
economic system is then treated as external and autonomous in relation 
to these two larger life-sustaining systems. The transformation involves 
four main processes. 
 First, indigenous peoples have been dispossessed of and removed from 
their life ways and ecosystems in which Homo sapiens co-evolved for 
150,000 years in the name of development and progress. The genocide and 
destruction of indigenous peoples and their cultural systems is treated as 
external to the economic system imposed over their traditional territories.  12  
 10  For a critical approach to this neoliberal global constitutionalism, see  S  Gill and  AC  Cutler 
(eds),  New Constitutionalism and World Order ( Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge ,  2015 ). 
 11  See Dilworth,  Too Smart for Our Own Good (n 5); Bardi,  The Limits to Growth 
Revisited (n 8);  P  Evans ,  ‘Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?’ ( 2005 )  36 ( 2 )  Politics and 
Society  271 – 305 . 
 12  AJ  Hall ,  Earth into Property: Colonization, Decolonization, and Capitalism ( McGill-
Queen’s University Press ,  Montreal ,  2010 ). 
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 Second, the legal-economic system of privatisation and commodiﬁ cation 
of the living earth as a storehouse of ‘natural resources’ is imposed ﬁ rst 
in Europe then throughout the colonised world. This commodiﬁ cation 
disembeds natural resources from their place and participation in the 
interdependent and symbiotic ecological relationships and cycles that 
sustain all life on earth. It inserts them into the abstract and competitive 
relationships of the global market system. The damage and destruction 
to the surrounding, life-sustaining ecosystems caused by the extraction, 
production, transportation, consumption and disposal of these commodities 
is treated as external to the economic system. 
 Third, the productive capabilities of human beings are also treated 
as commodities for sale on the labour market by the spread of Western 
contract, labour and corporate law. This disembeds collective human 
producing and consuming capabilities and activities from the surrounding 
interdependent social and community relationships in which they take place. 
It inserts productive capacities as individual commodities (self-ownership) 
into abstract, competitive and non-democratic global labour market 
relationships. The alienation and exploitation this causes to the well-being 
of workers and the damage that competition does to the larger social 
relations in which they live are treated as externalities. 
 Fourth, the medium of exchange – money – is itself transformed into 
a commodity in the ﬁ nancial market. Money is disembedded from its role 
in fair exchange relations in which the partners are constrained to take 
reciprocal care of the well-being or suffering of each other as a result of the 
exchange. It is inserted in abstract and competitive ﬁ nancial exchanges in 
which proﬁ t maximisation is the overriding consideration. The marginalisation 
of gift-reciprocity or mutual-aid exchange relationships among the partners 
is treated as external to the ﬁ nancial system, leading to the ﬁ nancial crises 
and austerity programmes of the present. Polanyi predicted that the result of 
this great transformation would be disastrous for individuals, communities 
and the living earth.  13  
 The ‘fatal ﬂ aw’ of this economic system is that if the costs of the 
repair to all the damage it does to the externalised life-support systems 
were ‘internalised’, the system would be unproﬁ table and would collapse.  14  
 13  Polanyi,  The Great Transformation (n 2) 97 : ‘To allow the market mechanism to be sole 
director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment … would result in the 
demolition of society. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings 
would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social 
dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its 
elements, neighbourhoods and landscapes deﬁ led, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, 
the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed.’ 
 14  Brown,  World on the Edge (n 6) 8; cf. Bardi,  The Limits to Growth Revisited (n 8). 
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And, much of the damage is unrepairable. Moreover, it is not simply a 
matter of transitioning from non-renewable to renewable energy because 
the system exploits renewable resources at a rate that exceeds the slow 
temporality of the renewability cycles of renewable resources and their 
ecosystems (Jevons law).  15  And, the race for what’s left of renewable 
resources is as much the cause of the crises as the exploitation of non-
renewable fossil fuels and other non-renewables.  16  The development 
paradigm becomes a super-predatory system that eventually destroys the 
life systems on which it depends and destroys itself. This has happened 
with many super-predatory species in the past, but not on this scale.  17  
 As these features of the global development paradigm became clear in the 
1970s and 1980s, from the limits to growth literature to the Gaia hypothesis, 
the initial response was to protect the system by grafting sustainability on to 
development with the elastic phrase ‘sustainable development’. It became 
the legitimating norm under which global economic constitutionalism 
expanded and was unsuccessfully contested. But, as the present crises and 
scientiﬁ c predictions substantiate, sustaining humans and the living systems 
that support them is incompatible with the development paradigm. If the 
precautionary principle were applied on the basis of the latest earth and 
social science predictions the economic system would have to be shut down. 
Hence, the choice here and now appears to be either unsustainable economic 
constitutionalism and much harder and catastrophic times or a sustainable 
alternative paradigm of economics, law and governance.  18  
 V.  Eco-social constitutionalism 
 Here is an alternative to this unsustainable global system. It is to create 
sustaining social systems by learning from the way life systems have sustained 
and diversiﬁ ed life on earth over 3.5 billion years. The basic principle is that 
successful life systems sustain themselves and their members in ways that 
also internalise and co-sustain the interdependent and intra-dependent life 
systems on which they co-depend: that is, by symbiosis and symbiogenesis. 
 15  R  Heinberg and  D  Lerch (eds),  The Post Carbon Reader. Managing the 21st Century’s 
Sustainability Crises ( University of California Press ,  Berkeley, CA ,  2010 ). 
 16  M  Klare ,  The Race for What’s Left: The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources 
( Picador ,  New York, NY ,  2012 ). 
 17  Dilworth,  Too Smart for Our Own Good (n 5);  P  Ward ,  The Medea Hypothesis: Is Life 
on Earth Ultimately Destructive? ( Princeton University Press ,  Princeton, NJ ,  2009 ). 
 18  See  J  Lovelock ,  The Rough Ride to the Future ( Allen Lane ,  London ,  2014 ) . Lovelock 
sees our situation in this way but does not offer an alternative. However, his former student 
and co-researcher, S Harding, builds on Lovelock’s work to present an alternative vision 
complementary to the one presented below (see Harding,  Animate Earth (n 7). 
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Life systems internalise their environments. Photosynthesis cycles, in which 
the emissions of each life form are usable or reusable by interdependent 
others, are the primary co-sustaining life cycles. The now widely accepted 
Gaia theory of James Lovelock holds that the self-sustaining features of 
the living earth system as a whole are themselves emergent properties of 
symbiosis and symbiogenesis of its member systems. Humans can learn 
from the way life co-sustains life. Accordingly, it is possible to learn or 
relearn, from the living earth and from contemporary life and earth sciences 
how to design sustainable social systems that co-sustain the interdependent 
social and ecological systems on which they reciprocally depend. This is 
called the great re-embedding or reconnection.  19  
 This alternative co-sustaining, post-development paradigm already 
exists in what is called ‘legal globalisation from below’ and ‘eco-social 
constitutionalisation’.  20  It consists in practices and networks of internalising 
interdependency, co-sustenance and well-being of ‘all affected’. These 
include: ecological footprint analysis of each practice, using renewable 
energy sources, cyclical steady-state economics rather than the linear growth 
economics, fair trade rather than free trade, governing the commons rather 
than the tragedy of privatisation and commodiﬁ cation, democratic 
cooperatives and community-based businesses rather than TNCs, community-
based and networked direct democracy as the basis of representative 
democracy, co-sustaining ‘cradle to cradle’ recycling technology and 
industrial planning rather than ‘cradle to grave’ technology of extraction, 
externalisation and waste, caring for common goods before private interests, 
non-violent means rather than violence, learning from and with indigenous 
peoples and their earth ways, and the application of the local and global 
principle that ‘all affected have a say (or are stakeholders)’ with respect to 
the exercise of any relationship of power. 
 In contrast to the development paradigm, in eco-social constitutionalism 
the means are instantiations of the ends in each of these practices: 
sustainability is pursued by sustainable means; peace by peaceful means; 
democracy by grass-roots democratic organisation: that is, the Gandhian 
principle of being the change. As a consequence, the modern ideal of 
 19  For the most comprehensive account of this view, see  F  Capra and  PL  Luisi ,  The Systems 
View of Life: A Unifying Vision ( Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge ,  2014 ) . The following 
summary draws on this synthetic work. 
 20  For a comprehensive account of eco-social constitutionalism, see  F  Capra and 
 U  Mattei ,  The Ecology of Law: Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community 
( Berrett-Koehler Publishers ,  Oakland, CA ,  2015 ) . Compare S Bailey and U Mattei, ‘Social 
Movements as Constituent Power: The Italian Struggles for the Commons’ (2013) 20(2)  Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 965–1013; and  B  de Sousa Santos and  CA  Rodríguez-
Garavito (eds),  Law and Globalization from Below ( Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge , 
 2005 ). 
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coordinating constituent power and rule of law is realised to a greater 
degree in these practices than in our best representative institutions.  21  
These practitioners strive to realise human rights, democracy and rule of 
law, but they do so in a revolutionary way. They reinterpret and reapply 
these three norms not only in contextual, self-governing ways, but also 
under the normative framework of sustainability and well-being. Perhaps 
most important of all, eco-social constitutionalism, following indigenous 
peoples’ constitutionalism, cognises natural resources, human resources 
and human exchanges as always already embedded within the larger life-
sustaining social and ecological networks and cycles. Capra and Mattei 
call these ‘ecolegal orders’ and see them as the constitution of a new and 
renewed sustainable, Gaia-centric paradigm.  22  
 This vision is hardly utopian or unachievable. There are over 800 
million people engaged in these everyday practices of local and global 
constitutionalism from below and there is a large body of academic 
research on them.  23  This is more people than participate in TNCs.  24  
Indigenous peoples and the Indigenous Peoples Working Group on 
Climate Change (IPWGCC) are at the heart and frontlines of this global 
movement.  25  However, by themselves they are unable to dislodge or 
transform the dominant paradigm, which not only continues, but often 
either preys on the ecological and social repair and regrowth they 
generate or brings them down by the force of economic constitutionalism, 
austerity measures and emergency law. 
 VI.  Contestatory constitutionalism 
 If the participants of eco-social constitutionalism wish to transform the 
development paradigm, they need to ﬁ nd ways to join hands with those 
who are striving to contest, reform and transform it from within its 
economic, legal and governance institutions and processes. Many of the 
articles in  Global Constitutionalism have been excellent case studies of 
 21  Bailey and Mattei, ‘Social Movements as Constituent Power’ (n 20). 
 22  Capra and Mattei,  The Ecology of Law (n 20). See also  B  de Sousa Santos ,  Epistemologies 
of the South: Justice against Epistemicide ( Routledge ,  London ,  2014 ). 
 23  P  Hawken ,  Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being 
and Why No One Saw It Coming ( Viking ,  New York, NY ,  2007 ). 
 24  J  Restakis ,  Humanizing the Economy: Co-operatives in the Age of Capital ( New Society 
Publishers ,  Gabriola Island ,  2010 ). 
 25  Z  Grossman (ed),  Asserting Native Resilience: Paciﬁ c Rim Indigenous Nations Face the 
Climate Crisis ( Oregon State University Press ,  Portland, OR ,  2012 ) . For an example of the 
indigenous philosophies that underlie indigenous constitutionalism, see  ER  Atleo (Umeek), 
 Tsawalk: A Nuu-chah-nulth Worldview ( UBC Press ,  Vancouver ,  2004 ). 
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individual and collective actors engaged in diverse forms of contestation 
of the development paradigm and economic constitutionalisation by 
exercising formal human rights, representative democracy and rule of law 
available to them in innovative ways. We call these activities agonistic or 
‘contestatory global constitutionalism’, using contestation in a broad sense.  26  
As we have suggested above, while contestatory actors have been able to 
regulate and reform economic constitutionalism to a limited extent, they 
have been unable to slow down its rapid pace, let alone transform it. 
 However, if practitioners of eco-social and contestatory constitutionalism 
were to ﬁ nd ways to network and coordinate their activities, they just might 
be able to build up an alternative world with the exemplarity, momentum 
and non-violent means to transform unsustainable constitutionalisation and 
its development paradigm, thereby proving the doomsayers wrong.  27  There 
are good reasons why the two types of citizen engagement – often call 
‘horizontality’ (power-with organisation) and ‘verticality’ (power-over 
organisation) – should join hands. They both share the same constitutional 
norms of sustainability and well-being and the all-affected principle in 
conjunction with human rights, democracy and rule of law, yet enact them 
differently. Eco-social citizens put into practice what contestatory citizens 
argue for in public spheres, courts, representative institutions and institutions 
of global governance. Reciprocally, the gains that contestatory actors make 
in ofﬁ cial institutions protect and support the fragile practices of eco-social 
actors. Many of their activities overlap in practice; for example, when 
community-based organisations ﬁ nd it necessary to go to court or elect 
supportive representatives. Moreover, most citizens responding to the 
four crises are engaged in practices of both contestatory and eco-social 
constitutionalism in their daily lives, so the grounds of their coordination 
and integration already exist. 
 Yet, these two modes of constitutionalism often are seen as either 
working separately or eco-social organisations are subordinated to social 
movements oriented to gaining power in the ofﬁ cial vertical institutions by 
elections or revolutions. Nevertheless, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos was 
among the ﬁ rst to point out, there are several contemporary attempts to 
coordinate the two modes of constitutionalism democratically and without 
subordination so that they are co-sustaining and co-empowering. Well-
known examples exist in Spain, Italy, India, and between indigenous peoples 
 26  A  Wiener ,  A Theory of Contestation ( Springer ,  New York, NY ,  2014 ) 
 27  The doomsayers who predict the self-destruction of the majority of the world’s population 
due to the three crises standardly overlook socio-ecological and contestatory constitutionalism. 
See, for example, Dilworth,  Too Smart for Our Own Good (n 5); Ward,  The Medea Hypothesis 
(n 17);  S  Emmott ,  Ten Billion ( Penguin ,  New York, NY ,  2014 ). 
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and the government of Bolivia. Participants learn from their successes and 
failures, and from globally connected academic research and discussions 
with them and many other examples, and move forward in networks of 
reciprocal elucidation.  28  
 Conclusion: Integral constitutionalism 
 In the  Encyclical on Climate Change and Inequality , Pope Francis calls the 
general kind of coordinated thinking and acting together of socio-ecological 
and contestatory constitutionalism to care for our common home – our 
communities and the living earth – ‘integral ecology’.  29  The speciﬁ c version 
we have put forward thus could be called integral constitutionalism.  30  As 
we mentioned in the Introduction, a central role of  Global Constitutionalism 
is to disclose and discuss the emergence of constitutional qualities that 
coordinate law and governance in different ways in the global ﬁ eld. The 
perspective we have brieﬂ y introduced brings to light three distinctive types 
of global constitutionalism and the important challenge of coordinating two 
of them into an integral constitutionalism. We are pleased to bring it into the 
 Global Constitutionalism arena, invite critical discussion of it, and thereby 
partake in the larger discussion already underway. 
 28  For an in-depth study of the relation between socio-ecological constitutionalism (15M) 
and contestatory constitutionalism (Podemos) and the dilemma of non-subordination in Spain 
see  P  Ouziel ,  Vamos Lentos Porque Vamos Lejos: Towards a Dialogical Understanding of 
Spain’s 15M (PhD Dissertation,  University of Victoria ,  British Columbia ,  2015 ) . For Italy, 
see Bailey and Mattei, ‘Social Movements as Constituent Power’ (n 20). For India, see  V  Shiva , 
 Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace ( South End Press ,  Cambridge ,  2005 ) . For 
Bolivia, see Grossman,  Asserting Native Resilience (n 25) and E Sahle, ‘Spaces of Freedom, 
Citizenship and State in the Context of Globalization: South Africa and Bolivia’ in  R  Nichols 
and  J  Singh (eds),  Freedom and Democracy in an Imperial Context ( Routledge ,  London ,  2014 ) 
 147 –74. 
 29  Pope  Francis ,  Encyclical on Climate Change and Inequality: On Care for Our Common 
Home ( Melville House ,  London ,  2015 ). 
 30  For critical discussion of aspects of integral constitutionalism, see  R  Nichols and  J  Singh 
(eds),  Freedom and Democracy in an Imperial Context ( Routledge ,  London ,  2014 ) and  J  Tully , 
 On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue ( Bloomsbury ,  London ,  2014 ). 
